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Abstract 
What happens when information reaches the human brain? In economics, a black-box 
approach to information processing in the brain is generally taken with an implicit 
assumption that information, once it reaches the brain, is accurately processed. In sharp 
contrast, research in brain sciences has established that when information reaches the 
brain, a mental template or schema (neural substrate of knowledge) is first activated, which 
influences information absorption. Schemas are created through a resource intensive 
process in which finite brain resources are allocated to different tasks, with resource 
allocation in the brain having an impact on the structure of schemas. In this article, we 
explore the implications of this richer view from brain sciences for the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM). We show that two versions of CAPM arise depending on how the brain 
resources are allocated in schema creation. In one version, the relationship between beta 
and expected returns is flat along with features akin to value, size, and momentum effects. 
In the second version, the relationship between beta and expected return is strongly 
positive with an implied risk-free rate which could be negative. Novel predictions emerging 
from this approach are: momentum is negatively correlated with value, size, and betting-
against-beta, and stocks that command a lion’s share of investor attention have lower risk-
adjusted returns.  
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Resource Allocation in the Brain and the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model 
 
What happens when information reaches the human brain? In economics, a black-box 
approach to information absorption is typically taken with an implicit assumption that 
information, when it reaches the brain, is accurately processed. In sharp contrast, research 
in brain sciences has established that when information reaches the brain, a mental 
template or schema, is first activated, which influences information absorption.1 Brain 
imaging studies show that schema formation is a resource-intensive process that involves 
different regions of the brain talking to each other2; however, these schemas, once formed, 
make subsequent processing of schema-consistent information a lot faster.3   In this article, 
we study the implications of this richer view from brain sciences for the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM).  
 A schema can be conceived as a scaffold or a blueprint,4 representing a pre-existing 
knowledge structure. Neurologically, it is a brain template that involves systems of neurons 
across various brain regions talking to each other, with each system constituting a particular 
unit in the schema. That is, schemas contain units as well as relationships between these 
units. For example, for a car schema, units could be car body and wheel, with the 
relationship that car body contains four wheels. For a firm schema, units could be expected 
cash flow levels and associated risks with a specific relationship between these units. 
Schemas, by only containing the essential details, simplify the world. They direct attention 
to relevant aspects, and speed-up processing of information that fits within the schema.  
New schemas are created by attempting to appropriately modify a related schema.  
Brain organizes knowledge in a network of such interconnected schemas. For example, a 
child may initially only have a schema for a horse (large with four legs, hair, and a tail). 
 
1 There is a large body of literature in neuroscience that explores various facets of schemas and how they 
influence information absorption (for a review, see van Kesteren et al (2012), Gilboa and Marlatte (2017), 
Spalding et al (2015) and references therein).  
2 See Ohki and Takei (2018) and references therein.  
3 Sweegers et al (2015) 
4 See Hampson and Morris (1996) or Anderson (2000) for a detailed review of schema theory. 
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However, when she encounters a cow, a new schema for a cow could be created by 
modifying the horse schema. Similarly, relevant to our context, an investor analysing a firm 
for the first time, may create a new schema for the firm by altering the schema of a similar 
firm that she has analysed before. Studying the implications of such a schema-creation 
process for CAPM is the subject of this article.  
Research in brain sciences has established that there is brain specialization with 
different brain systems performing different tasks and competing for scarce resources that 
are allocated by a ‘central executive system’ (CES) located in the lateral prefrontal cortex 
(see Alonso et al (2014) and references therein).  This suggests that, while modifying an 
existing schema to create a new one, each unit in a schema is exclusively worked on by a 
distinct system of neurons. Each system makes demands for resources with task 
performance dependent on resource allocation. For relatively simple schemas (such as for a 
cow or a car), the resource constraint is not binding and all units in an existing schema are 
fully adjusted to create accurate units in the new schema. However, for sufficiently complex 
schemas such as a firm schema, the resource constraint is likely to be binding. In the context 
of CAPM, keeping things simple, expected cash flows and risk of the cash flows are the two 
key units in the schema of a given firm. So, each unit is worked on by a different system of 
neurons while modifying an existing schema to create a new one. With a binding resource 
constraint, how the scarce brain resources are split across the two units matters.  
In this article, we consider two ways in which scarce brain resources can be allocated 
towards the two units while creating a new schema for a firm:5 
1) More resources are allocated to the brain system working on expected cash flows. 
2) More resources are allocated to the brain system working on risk of the cash flows. 
It follows that there are two types of traders: 1) Traders (cashflow-schema traders), 
who are better at processing cashflow information than risk information as they have a 
schema with a more accurate cashflow unit. Such traders either underreact or overreact to 
 
5 The third case in which the resources are split evenly across the two units is absorbed in the first case. This is 
because task complexity (number of distinct mental operations needed) is higher for risk estimation, which is 
known to lower task performance (Alonso et al 2014). So, with resources evenly split, risk unit is relatively 
more inaccurate. Hence, the same outcomes as in the first case are obtained in this case.  
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risk news. 2) Traders (risk-schema traders) who are better at processing risk-related 
information as they have a schema with a more accurate risk unit.  Such traders either 
underreact or overreact to cashflow news.  
We show that which trader type is marginal matters for CAPM. When a cashflow-
schema trader is marginal, a version of CAPM is obtained (cashflow-schema CAPM), which 
displays a flatter relationship between stock beta and expected excess returns. High-alpha-
of-low-beta along with features akin to value, size, and momentum effects arise in this 
version. Two novel predictions are:  momentum is negatively correlated with value, size, 
and betting-against-beta, and stocks that command a lion’s share of investor and analyst 
attention have lower risk-adjusted returns. 
When a risk-schema trader is marginal, another version of CAPM arises (risk-schema 
CAPM). In this version, there is a strong positive relationship between beta and expected 
excess return with an implied risk-free rate that could be negative. Stocks that do better in 
the first version (low beta, small) do worse in the second version. We hypothesize that, 
normally, the marginal investor is expected to be a cashflow-schema trader (Basu et al 
2013). However, consistent with the findings in Hendershott et al (2019) and Savor and 
Wilson (2014), there are specific times when the risk-schema trader is marginal such as at-
open and on macroeconomic announcement days, leading to a steeper relationship 
between beta and average stock returns at such times.  
Schemas, even though imperfect, generate price predictions that are rank-order 
correct: riskier stocks are priced lower than less risky stocks. This is a pretty good showing 
given the resource constraint.  A key advantage is that substantially less brain resources are 
needed to process information that fits within a schema, a process known as assimilation in 
cognitive science literature. Modifying or adapting a schema (accommodation) is much 
more resource intensive.6 So, diverting more brain resources to a particular schema 
(accommodation) has a substantial opportunity cost.  Hence, schemas, once established, are 
resistant to change.  
 
6 See van Kesteren and Meeter (2020) for a discussion on assimilation and accommodation processes in the 
context of brain processes.  
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2. CAPM adjusted for Resource Allocation in the Brain 
We take a modern derivation of CAPM (such as in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)) and add a 
twist to it, which is incorporating the implications of information processing through a 
schema as created by a resource-constrained brain. As in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), we 
consider an overlapping generations (OLG) economy. Each agent lives for two periods. 
Agents that are born at 𝑡 aim to maximize their utility of wealth at 𝑡 + 1. Their utility 
functions are identical and exhibit mean-variance preferences. They trade securities 𝑠 =1, ⋯ , 𝑆 where security 𝑠 pays dividends 𝑑𝑡𝑠and has 𝑛𝑠∗ shares outstanding, and invest the 
rest of their wealth in a risk-free asset that offers a rate of 𝑟𝐹. 
The market is described by a representative agent who maximizes: max 𝑛′{𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑡+1 + 𝑑𝑡+1) − (1 + 𝑟𝐹)𝑃𝑡} − 𝛾2 𝑛′Ω𝑡𝑛  
where 𝑃𝑡 is the vector of prices, Ω𝑡 is the variance-covariance matrix of 𝑃𝑡+1 + 𝑑𝑡+1, and 𝛾 is 
the risk-aversion parameter. 
It follows that the price of a security, 𝑠, is given by: 
𝑃𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) − 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )1 + 𝑟𝐹                                                                                               (2.1) 
where security 𝑠 payoff is 𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 = 𝑃𝑡+1𝑠 + 𝑑𝑡+1𝑠   
and the aggregate market payoff is: 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 = 𝑛1∗(𝑃𝑡+11 + 𝑑𝑡+11 ) + 𝑛2∗(𝑃𝑡+12 + 𝑑𝑡+12 ) +∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙ +𝑛𝑆∗(𝑃𝑡+1𝑆 + 𝑑𝑡+1𝑆 ). 
 
2.1 Schema Creation 
As discussed in the introduction, schema is a mental template that contains units as well as 
a relationship between units. With mean-variance preferences, the relevant units are 
expected cash flows and the risk of cash flows, with risk measured by covariance of cash 
flows with the aggregate market cash flows. We define a firm-schema as follows: “It is a 
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knowledge structure about a firm’s expected cashflows and associated risks, which 
facilitates processing new information to evaluate one’s willingness-to-pay (WTP)”.  
So, given (2.1), a firm-schema has the following general form: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃 =  𝐴 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 − (𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛)(𝐴 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  
To understand the process of schema creation, we consider how a typical stock 
analyst behaves while analysing a firm. Stock analysis is usually done at firm-level cashflows, 
which are then transformed to the level of an individual security. We denote firm-level 
earnings or cashflows by 𝜋𝑡+1𝑠  where the number of outstanding shares is 𝑛𝑠∗. Earnings-per-
share (EPS) is then given by: 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑡+1𝑠𝑛𝑠∗ . Denoting the price-earnings (P/E) ratio, 
inclusive of dividends, for firm 𝑠 by 𝑐𝑠: 
𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 = 𝑃𝑡+1𝑠 + 𝑑𝑡+1𝑠 = 𝑐𝑠(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1) = 𝑐𝑠 𝜋𝑡+1𝑠𝑛𝑠∗  
We assume that when a trader analyses the cash flows of a firm 𝑠 for the first time, she 
creates a schema by modifying the schema for a similar firm 𝑞 that she has analysed earlier. 
The two units that constitute a schema for a firm are: expected cashflows and the risk of 
cashflows. So, the process of creating a new schema by modifying an existing schema 
requires modifications in these two units. 
For expected cash flow levels, the modification is: 𝐸′(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝑚1𝐷1 
where 𝐷1 = 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 ) is the correct adjustment needed, and 0 ≤ 𝑚1 ≤ 1, 
captures the fraction of correct adjustment reached. If the brain is not resource constrained, 
then 𝑚1 = 1, which corresponds to full or correct adjustment. On the other hand, 𝑚1 < 1, 
indicates that the resource constraint in the brain is binding.  
Transforming to the level of EPS: 𝐸′(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 )𝑛𝑠∗ = 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 )𝑛𝑞∗ 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝑚1𝐷1𝑛𝑠∗  
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⇒ 𝐸′(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝑚1 (𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 )) 
⇒ 𝐸′(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝑚1) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 ) + 𝑚1𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 )                                                   
Similarly, the schema-unit for the risk of cash flows is obtained as follows: 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) − 𝑚2𝐷2 
⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑠∗ = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗ 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝑚2 (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗ 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑠∗ ) ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )= 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗− 𝑚2 (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )) ⇒𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = (1 − 𝑚2)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ + 𝑚2(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )) 
Following the behavior of a typical stock analyst, we define the notion of similar firms as 
having the following two properties: 
1) Firms that are in the same line of business, and 
2) Have the same P/E ratios. 
P/E ratios (inclusive of dividends) for 𝑠 and 𝑞 are 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑐𝑞, and applying the above 
properties, the firms are in the same line of business with similar P/E ratios:  𝑐𝑐 ≈ 𝑐𝑞 = 𝑐 
So, the schema-unit for risk of the cash flows is estimated as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = (1 − 𝑚2)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ + 𝑚2(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))       ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = (1 − 𝑚2)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ + 𝑚2(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))       
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⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )=  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )+ (1 − 𝑚2) (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))                               (2.2) 
Similarly, the schema-unit for expected cash flow levels can be written as: 
𝐸′(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝑚1) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 ) + 𝑚1𝐸(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 ) ⇒𝐸′(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝑚1) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) + 𝑚1𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) 
⇒ 𝐸′(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) =  𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝑚1) (𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ))                                      (2.3) 
(2.2) and (2.3) capture the following two properties associated with resource allocation in 
the brain (see Alonso et al (2014)): 
1) When a new schema is created by modifying an existing schema, the process is broken 
down into separate tasks, with each unit worked on by a separate system of neurons. Each 
system communicates its resource requirements to CES, which allocates finite brain 
resources between systems. 
2) The resource constraint is generally binding for complex schemas with task performance 
dependent on how much of resources are allocated to that particular task. 
 
2.2 Cashflow-Schema CAPM 
Schema creation is a resource intensive process. A separate system of neurons is allocated 
to each unit in the schema of a firm, with allocation of brain resources to the two units 
determined by CES. In this section, we assume that more resources are devoted to the unit 
for expected cash flows when compared with the unit for risk of the cash flows. That is, 𝑚1 > 𝑚2. We refer to such traders as having a cashflow-schema, and the CAPM so obtained 
is referred to as the cashflow-schema CAPM. In section 2.4, we consider the other case 
where 𝑚2 > 𝑚1 (with such traders referred to as risk-schema traders). 
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Without loss of generality, we set 𝑚1 = 1, it then follows that 𝑚2 = 𝑚 < 1. Suppose, there 
is a firm 𝑞 that had been analysed earlier, and its schema is modified to create a schema for 
firm 𝑠.  
The share price of firm 𝑞 is given by (from 2.1): 
𝑃𝑡𝑞 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )1 + 𝑟𝐹                                                                                               (2.4) 
And, the share price of firm 𝑠 is given by (using 2.2): 
𝑃𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) − 𝛾 {𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) + (1 − 𝑚) (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))} 1 + 𝑟𝐹  
                      (2.5) 
A schema is handy as it lowers the resource requirement for processing information that fits 
within a schema (for example, information about 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) or 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )). Using 𝐸𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 to denote the brain energy requirements for assimilation in the schema, and 𝐸 
to denote the requirements without a schema: 
Assimilation: 𝐸𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≪ 𝐸 
However, this resource saving comes at a cost, which is underreaction and overreaction to 
risk-news. There is underreaction to firm-specific risk news as: 𝜕𝑃𝑡𝑠𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = − 𝛾𝑚1 + 𝑟𝐹                                                                                                      (2.5.1) 
(2.5.1) shows underreaction to firm-specific risk-news as 𝑚 < 1 when compared with 
rational expectations (𝑚 = 1). There is also overreaction to irrelevant risk news as: 
𝜕𝑃𝑡𝑠𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = − 𝛾(1 − 𝑚) 𝑛𝑞
∗𝑛𝑠∗1 + 𝑟𝐹                                                                                          (2.5.2) 
(2.5.2) shows overreaction to irrelevant risk news as 𝑚 < 1 when compared with rational 
expectations (𝑚 = 1).  
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In contrast with assimilation, the process of modifying a schema (accommodation) is much 
more resource intensive. Accommodation involves spending resources to modify 𝑚. Using 𝐸𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 to denote the energy required for processing information about 𝑚: 𝐸𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≫ 𝐸𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
So, a schema, once established, is modified (accommodation) only if the additional benefits 
of doing so justify the high opportunity cost (high energy cost) involved.  
From (2.4) and (2.5), the expected returns of 𝑠 and 𝑞 are then (with 𝑅𝐹 = 1 + 𝑟𝐹): 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛾𝑃𝑡𝑞 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )                                                                                            (2.6) 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛾𝑃𝑡𝑠 {𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )+ (1 − 𝑚) (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))}                               (2.7) 
To fix ideas, initially it is useful to assume that there are just two firms in the market, 𝑠 and 𝑞 before generalizing to 𝑁 firms. Multiplying (2.6) by 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑛𝑞∗ 𝑃𝑡𝑞𝑃𝑡𝑀 , which is the weight of firm 𝑞 in the market portfolio (𝑃𝑡𝑀is the price of aggregate market portfolio), multiplying (2.7) by 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑛𝑠∗𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑡𝑀 , and adding: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛾𝑃𝑡𝑀 {𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑀) + (1 − 𝑚)(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑠∗)} 
⇒ 𝛾 = (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹)𝑃𝑡𝑀{𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑀) + (1 − 𝑚)(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑠∗)}                    (2.8) 
 
Substituting (2.8) in (2.6) and re-arranging/simplifying leads to the modified CAPM equation 
for 𝑞: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) ∙ 𝛽𝑞 ∙ ( 11 + (1 − 𝑚)(𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠))                             (2.9) 
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where 𝛽𝑞 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ,𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 )  and 𝛽𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ,𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 )  
Substituting (2.8) in (2.7) leads to: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) ∙ 𝛽𝑠 ∙ ( 1 + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 − 1)1 + (1 − 𝑚)(𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠))                         (2.10) 
(2.9) and (2.10) are modified CAPM expressions when schemas are created with a binding 
resource constraint (and with more brain resources allocated to the schema-unit concerned 
with expected cash flows). Note that (2.9) and (2.10) revert to the classical CAPM expression 
when 𝑚 = 1 (resource constraint in the brain is not binding).  
Generalizing to 𝑁 firms with several 𝑞 firms spawning new schemas of many 𝑠 firms, 
the corresponding CAPM expressions for 𝑞 and 𝑠 firms are: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) ∙ 𝛽𝑞∙ ( 11 + (1 − 𝑚)(∑ ∑ (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠)𝑠𝑞 ))                                                    (2.11)    𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) ∙ 𝛽𝑠
∙ ( 1 + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 − 1)1 + (1 − 𝑚)(∑ ∑ (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠)𝑠𝑞 ))                                                  (2.12)    
It is intriguing to note that CAPM expressions with finite brain resources have the same form 
as the classical CAPM with only one difference: a factor that multiplies 𝛽 appears. When the 
resource constraint is not binding, 𝑚 = 1, the multiplicative factor equals 1, so we revert 
back to the classical CAPM expression.  
 
2.3 High-alpha-of-low-beta, value, size, and momentum effects 
(2.12) and (2.11) show that the classical CAPM is a special case of a schema-adjusted CAPM. 
In schema-adjusted CAPM, there is an additional multiplicative factor, which multiplies 𝛽. 
12 
 
This factor reduces to 1 when the resource constraint is not binding. In other words, the 
schema-adjusted CAPM reduces to the classical CAPM when 𝑚 = 1.  
For a firm 𝑠 whose schema is created by modifying the schema of a similar firm 
(same line of business with similar P/E ratios) 𝑞, this additional multiplicative factor is equal 
to: 
 𝑓 = ( 1+(1−𝑚)(𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 −1)1+(1−𝑚)(∑ ∑ (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞−𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠)𝑠𝑞 ))                                                                                           (2.13) 
Firms to which investors and analysts devote most of their time are likely to be ones that 
spawn new schemas for other firms.  Investor and analyst attention is strongly asymmetric 
with large, prominent firms (high market capitalizations) getting a lion’s share (Fang and 
Peress 2009). This motivates the following assumption: 
• Within a group of firms whose schemas are spawned by the same firm, 𝑞, the 
following holds: 𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 > 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 for all 𝑠 
 
It follows that 𝑓 > 0. Proposition 1 shows the emergence of high-alpha-of-low-beta in the 
cashflow-schema CAPM 
 
Proposition 1 (High-alpha-of-low-beta) In a given cross-section of stocks, a stock with low 
beta outperforms a stock with large beta on a risk-adjusted basis, all else equal. 
Proof 
Suppose there are two stocks 𝑠 and 𝑠′ such that 𝛽𝑠 < 𝛽𝑠′ . Risk-adjusted return on 𝑠 is given 
by: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 = {1 + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 − 1)} × 1𝑔 × (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) 




Risk-adjusted return on 𝑠′ is given by: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′ = {1 + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠′ − 1)} × 1𝑔 × (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) 
As 𝛽𝑠 and 𝛽𝑠′  appear in the denominator on R.H.S, it follows that: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ]−𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 > 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ]−𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′  ∎ 
 
One can also see the size effect in the cashflow-schema CAPM as proposition 2 shows. 
 
Proposition 2 (Size effect) In a given cross-section of stocks, a stock with a lower weight in 
the market portfolio outperforms a stock with a higher weight on a risk-adjusted basis, all 
else equal 
Proof 
Suppose there are two stocks 𝑠 and 𝑠′ such that 𝑤𝑠 < 𝑤𝑠′ . Following the same steps as in 
the proof of proposition 1, it is easy to see that  
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ]−𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 > 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ]−𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′ . ∎ 
 
The cashflow-schema CAPM not only explains the high-alpha-of-low-beta and size-effect, 
but also the value effect. Value effect refers to the finding that a stock with low price to 
fundamentals tends to outperform a stock with high price to fundamentals.  Suppose there 
are two stocks 𝑠 and 𝑠′ that have the same fundamentals (expected cash flows and the risk 
of the cash flows). That is, 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ ), and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ). 
Assume that 𝑃𝑠 < 𝑃𝑠′ .  
If there is a value effect, then it must be so that  𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 > 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′  
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To see if the above is true, start from: 
𝑃𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 )−𝛾{𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )+(1−𝑚)(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ −𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))} 1+𝑟𝐹 < 𝑃𝑠′ =𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ )−𝛾{𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )+(1−𝑚)(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗ −𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))} 1+𝑟𝐹 . Assuming the same 
fundamentals across the two stocks, 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ ), and  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) =𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ), it follows that: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ > 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑡+1𝑞′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗  ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) > 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑡+1𝑞′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 
⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) {𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 1}>  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) {𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑡+1𝑞′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗ − 1} 
⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ > 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑡+1𝑞′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗  
⇒ 𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 > 𝑤𝑞′𝛽𝑞′𝑤𝑠′𝛽𝑠′                                                                                                                            (2.14) 
It follows immediately from (2.14) that: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 > 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′  
Proposition 3 follows. 
 
Proposition 3 (Value effect) In a given cross-section of stocks, a stock with low price to 





It is intriguing that features akin to value, and size, as well as high-alpha-of-low-beta can all 
be seen in the cashflow-schema CAPM that has the same form as the classical CAPM except 
for the appearance of a factor, 𝑓, which multiplies beta. This multiplicative factor is larger 
for small size stocks, for low beta stocks, and for value stocks.  
 
2.3.1 The Momentum Effect 
It is clear from (2.5) that schema-based stock price predictions are rank-order correct for all 
schemas spawned by the same firm 𝑞. That is, riskier stocks are priced lower than less risky 
stocks. If an investor decides to improve the schema of a particular firm by devoting more 
resources to it, there is an opportunity cost involved as these resources need to be diverted 
from elsewhere. So, unless the updated schema delivers additional benefits that exceed the 
opportunity costs, schema modification is not optimal. The additional benefits depend on 
the likelihood of the updated schema determining the stock price, which obviously depends 
on whether other investors are also updating the same schema or not.  Such coordinated 
schema updating may take place for stocks that have experienced positive shocks recently 
(momentum winners), with resources potentially being diverted away from the assimilation 
processes of momentum losers. Hence, 𝑚 goes up for momentum winners, which further 
increases their prices as can be seen from (2.5). The positive shocks followed by further 
price increases due to schema updating is akin to the momentum effect. A novel prediction 
arising from this mechanism is discussed in section 3. 
 
2.4 Risk-Schema CAPM 
When schema of a firm is being created by modifying an existing schema, the two schema-
units that need to be adjusted are expected cash flows and the risk of cash flows. In the 
previous sections, we considered the case when more brain resources are allocated to 
expected cash flows. In this section, we consider the other case: when more brain resources 
are allocated to the system of neurons working on the risk of cash flows. In (2.2) and (2.3), 
this means the following: 𝑚1 < 𝑚2. Without loss of generality, we set 𝑚2 = 1, it follows 
that 𝑚1 = 𝑚 < 1. 
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The stock of firm 𝑠, whose schema is obtained by modifying the schema of a similar firm 
(same line of business and P/E ratios) 𝑞, is priced as: 
𝑃𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 )) − 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )1 + 𝑟𝐹                         (2.15) 
The stock of firm 𝑞, whose schema is modified to obtain the schema for 𝑠, is priced as: 
𝑃𝑡𝑞 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )1 + 𝑟𝐹                                                                                             (2.16) 
Following the same set of steps as in section 2.2, the following generalized CAPM 
expressions for 𝑠 and 𝑞 stocks are obtained: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽𝑠 [𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹 + (1 − 𝑚)𝑃𝑡𝑀 ∑ ∑ (𝑛𝑞∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝑛𝑠∗𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ))𝑠𝑞 ]− (1 − 𝑚)𝑃𝑡𝑠 {𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 )}                                                               (2.17) 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽𝑞 [𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹 + (1 − 𝑚)𝑃𝑡𝑀 ∑ ∑ (𝑛𝑞∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝑛𝑠∗𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ))𝑠𝑞 ]     (2.18) 
where 𝑃𝑡𝑀 is the value of aggregate market portfolio.  The above can be simplified further by 
defining expected market capitalization inclusive of dividends as: 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) = 𝑛𝑞∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 )𝑃𝑡𝑀  and 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝑛𝑠∗𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 )𝑃𝑡𝑀 :   
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽𝑠 [𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹 + (1 − 𝑚) ∑ ∑ (𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 ))𝑠𝑞 ]− (1 − 𝑚) {𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 )𝑤𝑡𝑠 }                                                                (2.19) 
where 𝑤𝑡𝑠 = 𝑛𝑠∗𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑡𝑀  is the weight of stock s in the market portfolio.  
 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽𝑞 [𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹 + (1 − 𝑚) ∑ ∑ (𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 ))𝑠𝑞 ]              (2.20) 
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Given evidence that large firms (large market capitalizations) get a lion’s share of investor 
and analyst attention (Fang and Peress 2009), it is likely that they are the ones spawning 
schemas of other firms.  Hence, we assume that 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) > 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 ).   
 It is immediately obvious that, in risk-schema CAPM, the relationship between beta 
and excess stock return is steeper than what the classical CAPM predicts as beta is 
multiplied by a factor larger than excess market return. Larger the beta, bigger the 
improvement over classical CAPM prediction.  
Furthermore, the implied risk-free rate is smaller than what the classical CAPM 
predicts and could even be negative: 
𝑅𝐹′ = 𝑅𝐹 − (1 − 𝑚) {𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 )𝑤𝑡𝑠 }                                                                           (2.21) 
It is straightforward to see that large size (market capitalization) stocks do better in this 
version as the implied risk-free rate is larger for them. 
Proposition 4 formalizes the key differences between the two versions of CAPM. 
 
Proposition 4 (Differences between the two versions) CAPM when more brain resources 
are allocated to expected cash flows (Cashflow Schema CAPM) differs from the CAPM 
when more brain resources are allocated to the risk of cash flows (Risk schema CAPM) in 
the following ways: 
1) The former has a flatter relationship between beta and expected returns, whereas 
the latter has a steeper relationship between beta and expected returns. 
2) The implied risk-free rate is smaller in the latter and could be negative. 
3) Small size, and low beta stocks do better in the former whereas large size, and high 






3.  Novel Predictions 
Two novel predictions follow from the approach developed here. The first prediction follows 
from considering the explanation for the momentum effect. Using 𝑚∗ > 𝑚 to denote the 
updated value of 𝑚 for a stock, 𝑠′, which is a momentum winner, the updated factor 
multiplying beta is: 
𝑓 = ( 1 + (1 − 𝑚∗) ( 𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠′𝛽𝑠′ − 1)1 + (1 − 𝑚)(∑ ∑ (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠)𝑠≠𝑠′𝑞 ) + (1 − 𝑚∗)(𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠′𝛽𝑠′))                (2.22) 
So, when resources are devoted to updating the scheme of a momentum winner, the factor 
that multiplies its beta, 𝑓, falls. As this factor is responsible for value, size, and high-alpha-
of-low-beta effects, it follows that value, size, and betting-against-beta get weaker for the 
momentum winner. Hence, the first novel prediction is as follows: momentum is negatively 
correlated with value, size, and betting-against-beta. Intriguingly, negative correlations 
between momentum and value (Asness et al 2013) as well as momentum and size (Rabener 
2017) have already been noted in the empirical literature.  
 The second novel prediction follows from comparing the multiplicative factor for a 𝑞 
stock with the multiplicative factor of an 𝑠 stock. As 𝑞 stock belongs to a prominent firm 
that commands a lion’s share of investor and analyst attention, it likely spawns schemas of 𝑠 
firms. From (2.11) and (2.12): the multiplicative factor is smaller for 𝑞 stock; hence, the 
second novel prediction is that 𝑞 stocks or stocks that command a lion’s share of investor 
and analyst attention (media attention could be a proxy for that) have lower risk-adjusted 
returns. The findings in Fang and Peress (2009) are consistent with this prediction. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
Research in brain sciences has established that knowledge construction in the brain takes 
place via schema creation and modification. We show that incorporating this richer view 
from brain sciences into CAPM leads to two distinct versions of CAPM. One version 
potentially provides a unified explanation for high-alpha-of-low-beta, value, size, and 
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momentum effects, and generates two novel predictions. The second version has a steeper 
relationship between beta and average stock returns with an implied risk-free rate which is 
likely to be negative. Intriguingly, Hendershott et al (2019) note that at-open, the 
relationship between beta and average stock return is steeper. Similarly, Savor and Wilson 
(2014) have noted a steeper relationship as well on macroeconomic announcement days. 
Could it be that we observe the second version of CAPM at such specific times due to risk-
schema traders being marginal? This line of thinking is promising as, arguably, trades on 
such specific times are driven by risk-reductions, to which the cashflow schema traders 
underreact, making risk-schema traders marginal. 
 
References  
Alonso, Brocas, and Carrillo (2014), “Resource allocation in the brain”, Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 81, pp. 501-534.  
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders. 5th. Washington, DC. 
 
Anderson, J. R. (2000). Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications (5th ed.). New York, NY. 
Worth Publishers.  
 
Asness, Tobias, and Maskowitz (2013), “Value and Momentum Everywhere”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 68, Issue 3, pp. 929-985 
 
Basu, Duong, Markov and Tan (2013), “How Important are Earnings Announcements as an 
Information Source”, European Accounting Review, Vol. 22, pp. 221-256. 
 
Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005), “Money illusion in the stock market: The Modigliani-
Cohn hypothesis”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, pp. 639 – 668. 
Fang and Peress (2009), “Media coverage and the cross section of stock returns”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 64, pp. 2023-2052. 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), “Betting against beta”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
114, pp. 1-25. 
Gilboa, A., and Marlatte, H. (2017), “Neurobiology of schema and schema mediated 
memory”, Trends in Cognitive Science, Vol. 21, pp. 618-631. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), “The economic implications of corporate financial 
reporting”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 3-73. 
20 
 
Hampson, P. J. & Morris, P. E. (1996) Understanding Cognition. Cambridge, MA. Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Hendershott, Livdan, and Rosch (2019), “Asset pricing: A tale of night and day”, Journal of 
Finance (Forthcoming) 
Ohki and Takei (2018), “Neural mechanisms of mental schema: a triplet of delta, low 
beta/spindle and ripple oscillations”, European Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 48, pp. 2416-
2430. 
Rabener, N. (2017), “Factors: Correlation Check”, Available at 
https://www.factorresearch.com/research-factor-correlation-check 
Spalding, Jones, Duff, Tranel, and Warren (2015), “Investigating the Neural Correlates of 
Schemas: Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Is Necessary for Normal Schematic Influence on 
Memory”, Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 35, pp. 15745-15751. 
Sweegers, Coleman, van Poppel, Cox, and Talamini (2015), “Mental schemas hamper 
memory storage of goal-irrelevant information”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, Vol. 9, 
pp. 6-29. 
van Kesteren MT, and Meeter (2020), “How to Optimize Knowledge Construction in the 
Brain”, Science of Learning, 5, Article Number 5 
van Kesteren MT, Ruiter DJ, Fernandez G, Henson RN (2012), “How schema and novelty 
augment memory formation”, Trends in Neuroscience, Vol. 35, pp. 211–219. 
